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The present special issue deals with the control of cog-
nitive processes. Modern cognitive psychology has been
quite successful in analyzing and capturing the basic
characteristics of all sorts of processes, ranging from
those taking care of perceptual information to memory,
from reasoning to the planning and execution of action.
Experimental analyses of these processes require people
to carry out particular tasks, tasks in which the investi-
gated process, or its products, play a crucial role. How
these tasks are implemented is very transparent from the
experimenter’s point of view. One typically presents an
aural or written instruction, asks the subject whether he
or she has understood, probably adds some more
explanation, and the experiment is ready to begin.
However, from the subject’s point of view, things are
much less transparent. True, the subjective experience
commonly mirrors the experimenter’s impression. One
tries understanding the instruction, probably asks a few
more questions, prepares oneself for the task, and is ready
to go. And yet, the how of this goal-directed preparation
is very poorly understood. In some way, people must be
able to conﬁgure and re-conﬁgure their cognitive system
in a way that task-relevant information is picked up,
maintained and stored eﬃciently, and that appropriate
actions are prepared, planned, and then executed in the
light of the available information. But we are only
beginning to understand, how this conﬁguration works.
A renaissance of cognitive control
Fortunately, research on how people set up and direct
processing streams to achieve intended goals has seen a
renaissance in the last decade or so. Yet, the middle ages
preceding this renaissance were long-lasting and fol-
lowed a short-lived beginning. Back in the late 1800s
and early 1900s, in the heyday of introspective psy-
chology, cognitive control was a major ingredient
of psychological consideration, such as in the works
of William James (1890) or Narziss Ach (1910). The
expression of personal goals and interests was com-
monly attributed to two (still!) dominating faculties:
attention, which takes care of the selection and preferred
processing of goal-related environmental events, and the
will, which is responsible for organizing movement
elements to bring about the intended goal event. Most
research eﬀorts were directed towards characterizing the
phenomenological outcome of attention and will, such
as the increase in vividness of images of attended objects
or the experience of commitment for self-intended
actions. But the processing side was not ignored entirely.
In fact, Ach (1910, 1935) and his colleagues devised
many new experimental paradigms to investigate the
interaction of, and conﬂict between, overlearned habits
and intentional processes, such as his ‘‘combined meth-
od’’ (see Hommel, 2000a). Very soon, however, cogni-
tive psychology lost interest in goals and their impact on
information processing, and left this ﬁeld to motiva-
tional and occupational psychology. The dark ages
closed upon cognitive control, which was of little
conceptual use for the behavioristic account of human
action.
The renaissance of cognitive control can be dated
back to the papers of Atkinson and Shiﬀrin (1968) and
Shiﬀrin and Schneider (1977), who re-introduced the
distinction between automatic and control(led) processes
(Ach’s habits and intentional processes) into psycho-
logical theorizing. This distinction has shown to be of
considerable use in many areas of cognitive psychology,
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as witnessed by the contributions to this issue by
LaBerge, Godijn and Theeuwes, Hommel and Eglau,
Ridderinkhof, and Burle et al. However, as LaBerge
rightly warns us, the distinction was not always well
deﬁned in early control accounts and its implications are
not always obvious. In particular, terms like ‘‘attention’’
(which often comprises the semantics of the outdated
‘‘will’’ as well) are frequently used to characterize both
the product (or ‘‘expression’’, in LaBerge’s terminology)
of goal-related selectivity as well as the cause of it; this
means mixing up what is controlled and what does the
controlling – not a good basis for understanding how
control is actually carried out (Allport, 1980; Neumann,
1987). To avoid problems of this sort, more recent
models are not only more speciﬁc than earlier ones with
regard to mechanisms, they also tend to restrict their
focus explicitly on either the cause of control or its
consequences. For instance, authors such as Baddeley
(1986) or Logan and Gordon (2001) follow the explicit
strategy to treat the cause of control while trying to nail
down the speciﬁcs of its eﬀects on information pro-
cessing. In contrast, authors such as Cohen (Cohen,
Braver, & O’Reilly, 1998; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClel-
land, 1990) or Meyer and Kieras (1997) are concen-
trating more on modeling the (main) cause of control
itself. Whatever strategy one may prefer, much progress
has been made in very recent years, especially in the
context of task-switching and dual-task performance,
and in behavioral and neurophysiological analyses of
working-memory functions (for overviews, see Monsell
& Driver, 2000; and D’Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 2000,
respectively). The present selection of papers provides an
up-to-date spotlight on these and related developments
by bringing together views and opinions from a wide
variety of research domains. However, although the
domains covered are varied, the contributions to this
special issue do converge to form a coherent picture; a
picture that we think is representative of our current
understanding of cognitive control as a whole. In par-
ticular, two basic take-home messages are emerging,
which we will brieﬂy discuss in turn.
Cognitive control as an emergent property
One of the above-mentioned messages is that cognitive
control functions should not necessarily be considered
as basic mental functions, supported by speciﬁc dedi-
cated systems or neural circuits – as implied by earlier
models (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) – but might
well be conceived of as emergent properties, being es-
tablished by the conﬁguration and tailoring of existing
subordinate processes in such a fashion that ‘new’,
unique functions emerge. In the contributions to this
special issue, this message comes in various ﬂavors and
with respect to various types of sources. Indeed, factors
that interact, and sometimes compete, to produce
cognitive control can be categorized with respect to at
least two dimensions. First, control commonly reﬂects
the joined inﬂuence of internal factors, such as goal-
related attentional control settings (Folk, Remington,
& Johnston, 1992) and external factors, such as salient
stimulus events (Theeuwes, 1994). This joined inﬂuence
is especially obvious in visual attention, as pointed out
in depth and with reference to the underlying neural
machinery, in the paper of LaBerge. But it also plays a
role in the control of response selection and dual-task
performance, as discussed in the contributions of Rid-
derinkhof, Burle et al., and Hommel and Eglau. Thus,
as anticipated by Ach (1910), perceiving a perceptual
event and selecting an appropriate action is usually the
outcome of a dynamic conﬂict between stimulus-driven
tendencies and habits, on the one hand, and goal-
related cognitive sets, on the other. (For an analysis of
the dynamics of control in such conﬂicts, see Ridder-
inkhof, 2002). Second, control is unlikely to be divided
into pure input selection and pure output selection but,
rather, seems to emerge from the interaction of per-
ceptual and response-related selection processes. This is
implicated by the ﬁndings of Godijn and Theeuwes,
who demonstrate that and also how the visual search
for a particular target stimulus can be aﬀected by
oculomotor programming, as well as by Magen and
Cohen, who show that response requirements have a
direct impact on what stimulus information is selected
for further processing. These observations speak
against a sharp separation of perceptual and action-
related stages and, instead, suggest that selection in
perception and action planning takes place in a com-
mon representational medium (Hommel, Mu¨sseler,
Aschersleben, & Prinz, in press).
Delegating control
Another related take-home message is that internal
control delegates and, therefore, is always relative in
several respects (Hommel, 2000b). Indeed, if cognitive
control is about goals and interests, it should be con-
cerned with behavioral outcomes, not (necessarily) the
details of the processes actually producing them. A
good reason for delegating control to sub-ordinate
processes is that internal higher-level control processes
seem to be slow and inert. Accordingly, they do not
seem to monitor and steer task-related processes too
closely but, rather, merely enable and parameterize
(then) autonomously-running processes, and only re-
adjust them from time to time. Altman discusses this
characteristic with regard to task-switching perfor-
mance. In his framework, control is mainly exerted by
means of storing a task goal into working memory. As
soon as this is achieved, the active impact of control
processes stops, so that success or failure in performing
the correct task is a direct function of forgetting, hence,
of the attributes of processes to which control has been
delegated.
Tombu and Jolicœur report evidence from experi-
ments and simulations suggesting that people are able to
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distribute their processing capacity among concurrent
tasks in a graded fashion. Once the distribution
parameter is set, further processing is shared accordingly
without further ado and adjustment, thus reﬂecting
again delegation of control to sub-ordinate processes.
Similarly, Burle et al. and Ridderinkhof discuss two
types of control-by-adjustment; one triggered by the
presence of response conﬂict and operating on a trial-
bytrial basis (and sometimes even within trials), and
another triggered by learning factors and working on a
slower, task-related time scale- comparable to that
implied by Tombu and Jolicœur’s model. Although with
diﬀering emphasis, Ridderinkhof, Burle et al., and
Tombu and Jolicœur deal with the ‘‘circularity’’ of
control, that is, the fact that internal control factors do
not only pre-set parameters for future action but
re-adjust parameters as a reaction to the registered
success or failure of a performed action. In a sense, this
can also be regarded as joint control by internal and
external factors.
How some of these iterative re-adjustments might
be triggered is investigated more closely in Jennings
and van der Molen’s paper. They show that perceiving
response conﬂict or negative feedback leads to char-
acteristic changes in heartbeat frequency and other
‘‘autonomic’’ reactions. These changes work back by
supporting central processes that resolve the conﬂict
and re-adjust the faulty action, thereby creating a kind
of optimization loop in which central control processes
use sub-cortical systems to steer cognitive task pro-
cesses. But delegating control has also a temporal as-
pect, as exempliﬁed in the contribution of Botvinick
and Plaut. They suggest that more complex action
sequences are represented in a distributed fashion and
by integrating goal states (i.e., task context) into an
action’s cognitive representation. This has several ad-
vantages for performance on later occasions. Not only
does the composed nature of the representation facili-
tate transfer to other, similar novel actions, the inte-
gration of the goal states also allows for the automatic,
context- or goal-induced activation of action skills. In
other words, integrating action representations with
information about what purposes they serve and what
intentions they satisfy represents a way to delegate
later control to automatic processes; internal and ex-
ternal circumstances are thereby enabled to do the
selection previously achieved by higher-level control
processes.
Looking ahead
In summary, we feel that this special issue provides a
lively, representative picture of current states of aﬀairs in
the area of cognitive control. It is to be expected that this
ﬁeld will progress fast and reveal new insights very soon.
Two of the trends that emerge from the current litera-
ture in cognitive neuroscience are likely to play a leading
role in this development.
Models of cognitive control:
verbal versus formal models
While descriptive models of cognitive control (e.g.,
Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shiﬀrin &
Schneider, 1977) have been most inﬂuential in generat-
ing conceptual and empirical hypotheses concerning
control functions, recent models tend to be increasingly
(anatomically and/or computationally) explicit about
the recruitment and/or intervention of control and
organization of basic cognitive processes (e.g., Cohen
et al., 1990; Kimberg & Farah, 1993). For instance, in
Cohen et al.’s (1990) model of Stroop task performance,
control is exerted by a module that speciﬁes the relevant
task (in this case, color naming), and that biases the ﬂow
of information processing. While these properties are
shared with the supervisory attentional system in
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) descriptive model, for
instance, the speciﬁc beneﬁt of formal computational
modeling is that it can quite accurately simulate a host
of benchmark phenomena.
Another attractive feature of formal models is that
contextual information (i.e., about the relevant task) is
represented in the same way as the other information (as
a pattern of activation across a set of units and their
interconnections), so that the control module has no
special status in the model. In order to deal with the
homunculus problem, the cognitive system may deter-
mine the need for control through the monitoring for
conﬂicts in information processing that occur, for
instance, when a stimulus aﬀords two competing
response tendencies (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). Con-
ﬂict is computed as a simple, multiplicative function of
the activation in competing response pathways. Detect-
ing conﬂict, an evaluative control function, leads then to
the recruitment of attentional/executive control pro-
cesses or, even more simply, to the consultation of a
contextual or goal state. Models along these lines may
easily account for systematic variations in control, such
as the observation that the Stroop eﬀect (Logan &
Zbrodoﬀ, 1979) and the Simon eﬀect (Hommel, 1994)
are reduced if incongruent trials are more frequent than
congruent trials or after an error has been committed (cf.
the contributions of Ridderinkhof and Burle et al. to the
present volume).
Failures of cognitive control
Interference eﬀects, typically taken to result from
intrinsic limitations of the eﬃciency of cognitive control
functions, might alternatively reﬂect failures to consis-
tently recruit or utilize cognitive control functions (e.g.,
Duncan et al., 1996). For instance, residual switch costs
in task switching (the increase in reaction-time associ-
ated with task-alternation as compared to task-repeti-
tion trials, despite the opportunity to prepare for the
up-coming change of task) appears to demonstrate in-
trinsic limitations to the ability to achieve a prepared
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state by fully endogenous means. Alternatively,
however, De Jong (2000) suggested (on the basis of
reaction-time mixture-distribution analyses) that while
on most trials people do engage the cognitive control
processes necessary in the preparation for a new task, on
some proportion of trials they fail to do so. Thus, on
switch trials responses are not slower than on repetition
trials unless the subject fails to initiate the adaptive
control process required to prepare for the new task.
Other interference eﬀects that have been attributed, at
least in part, to probabilistic (as opposed to intrinsic)
control failures include the Stroop eﬀect (De Jong,
Berendsen, & Cools, 1999) and the increased latency of
antisaccades (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2000).
Eﬀective recruitment of cognitive control requires an
explicit goal or intention (i.e., to exert control) to be
added to the basic goal structure that governs task
performance, and retrieval and the carrying out of this
intention at the proper time (cf. the contribution of
Botvinick & Plaut to the present volume). Failures of
this process may result in a behavioral phenomenon
called goal neglect, deﬁned by Duncan et al. (1996) as
disregard of a task requirement even though it has been
understood and remembered. This phenomenon is
characteristic of laboratory-task as well as daily-life
performance in patients with frontal lobe damage.
Control failures may play a role in many performance
deﬁciencies, and may provide a new research venue
within the area of cognitive neuroscience.
In closing
The impetus to compose this special edition came from
an international expert meeting on cognitive control that
we organized in Amsterdam in May/June 2001, an
Academy Colloquium sponsored by the Royal Nether-
lands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW in its
Dutch abbreviation) and co-sponsored by the Dutch
organization for scientiﬁc research (NWO). The success
of the meeting inspired us to compile a set of invited
papers, which in most part stem from participants to the
colloquium. We encouraged the authors to include pro-
vocative or even speculative discussions in their empirical
or theoretical work; nevertheless, the papers underwent
regular peer review to ascertain that the high quality
standards of Psychological Research are met. We wish to
express our gratitude to the referees, who gave generously
of their time to help improve the caliber of the manu-
scripts contained in this volume, and to Peter Frensch,
who spontaneously supported this project from the start.
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